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I. FOREWORD
As the wireless telecommunications revolution has expanded, so has
the demand for wireless communications facilities.' The number of
cellular subscribers in the U.S. has exploded in the past fifteen years
from zero to a current level of over 25 million.' In order to keep up with
the demand for service, cellular providers have installed some 22,000
radio transmission sites nationwide during the past 15 years Increasing
* Peter M. Degnan, Scott A. McLaren and T. Michael Tennant, all with Alston & Bird
in Atlanta, Georgia, were the first to successfully litigate a claim on behalf of a telecommu-
nications provider under Section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
("Telecommunications Act" or "Act"). Upon filing suit under Section 704 of the Act, Deg-
nan, McLaren and Tennant persuaded the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, Judge G. Ernest Tidwell, to force a local county government to grant the
cellular provider a permit to construct a cellular communications tower that had previously
been denied by the county. See BellSouth Mobility v. Gwinnett County, Georgia, 944 F.
Supp. 923 (N.D. Ga. 1996). Degnan, McLaren and Tennant have also advised GTE Mobil-
net, Inc. and other wireless providers on Telecommunications siting issues outside the State
of Georgia, specifically in Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
Peter M. Degnan is a partner at the Atlanta law firm of Alston & Bird. His practice fo-
cuses primarily on land use law with emphasis on litigation. Scott A. McLaren is an
associate in his sixth year of practice at Alston & Bird. He practices primarily in the areas of
land use litigation, and products liability litigation. T. Michael Tennant, also a partner at
Alston & Bird, focuses his practice on land use law and the regulation of real estate.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 609 et. seq.) (stating that the Act seeks to in part "encourage the rapid de-
ployment of new telecommunications technologies").
2. Microwave Journal, July 1, 1996, Vol. 39, No.7.
3. John J. Keller, With Cellular Towers Sprouting All Over, Towns Begin to Rebel,
Wall St. J., Jul. 2, 1996, at Al.
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demand for telecommunications services will require another 100,000
antennae installations in the coming years.4
The reason that increased consumer demand requires a correspond-
ing increase in the number of cellular transmission sites is simple. A
cellular network is much like a honeycomb. As a cellular user travels
from one area to another, the transmission of a telephone call is shifted
from one transmission site to the next. As demand increases, the area
over which the site can effectively transmit shrinks, causing gaps be-
tween the sites, or gaps in the "honeycomb." In order to fill these gaps,
cellular service providers must build additional sites to accommodate
the increased demand without eroding the quality of service.
Across the U.S., this wireless telecommunications revolution has
encountered significant resistance at the grassroots level . Although
consumers enjoy the flexible advantages of mobile communications,
they also express a "not in my backyard" attitude towards the infras-
tuctural requirements associated with cellular telephone service. For
example, in many localities, tower construction is bogged downin a
quagmire of community complaints and politically motivated govern-
mental reviews. Thus, cellular providers are saddled with increasing
demands of customers and federal licenses that require the cellular
company to provide adequate service6 in the face of increasing opposi-
tion to telecommunications siting.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, signed into law by President
Clinton in February, addresses, among many other important subjects,
some of the technical problems that have arisen from the increasing
popularity of mobile communications. This article will provide an over-
view of the Act and will focus specifically on the protections afforded a
telecommunications provider in § 704 of the Act.
II. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF THFE ACT
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Tele-
communications Act of 1996. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
("Telecommunications Act" or "Act") is "expansive legislation de-
signed primarily to increase competition in the telecommunications
4. Id.
5. Id. See also Spring Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D.
Wash. 1996) (resulting from City of Medina's enactment of a six-month moratorium on
issuing permits for wireless communications facilities such as cellular towers).
6. FCC licenses for cellular providers typically grant a provider the privilege of pro-
viding wireless communications services, while at the same time require that quality services
be provided by the licensee.
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industry."7 The legislative history of the Act evidences this competitive
objective: "[t]he managers on the part of the House and Senate [intend]
... to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory, national policy
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of
advanced telecommunications and information technologies and serv-
ices to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to
competition ... ." In fact, the House Report articulates that the
"enormous benefits to American businesses and consumers from lifting
the shackles of monopoly regulation will almost certainly earn the
[Telecommunications Act] the distinction of being the most deregula-
tory bill in history."9
III. SECTION 704 OF THE ACT: PROTECTIONS AFFORDED THE PROVIDER
IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
FACILITY SITING CONTExT
When attempting to locate a wireless telephone communications fa-
cility, such as a cellular transmission tower, a service provider typically
has to apply for and receive either a permit to construct the tower or a
rezoning of the land at issue to allow for such construction. Section 704
of the Act, to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c), provides certain statu-
tory protections to an applicant who applies for such a permit or
rezoning, provided the application involves the siting of a personal
wireless service facility such as a cellular tower.'0 These protections, of
course, are in addition to the standard protections afforded by equal
7. BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 927.
8. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
9. H.R. Rep. No. 104-204, at 47-48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11.
Section 253 of the Act accomplishes this purpose by removing barriers to entry. Section
253(a) states that "[n]o State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal re-
quirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide
any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." § 253(a), 110 Stat. 70 (to be codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 253(a)). As stated in the legislative history of section 253, this section is
"intended to remove all barriers to entry in the provision of telecommunication services.
[This new section] preempts any State and local statutes and regulations, or other State and
local legal requirements, that may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting any entity from
providing interstate or intrastate telecommunications services." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-
458, at 126 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 138.
10. The term "personal wireless service facility" is defined in the Act as a facility for
the provision of "commercial mobile services, unlicensed wireless services, and common-
carrier wireless exchange access services" which, of course, encompasses cellular transmis-
sion towers. § 704(c)(7)(C)(i-ii), 110 Stat. 152 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(C)(i-
ii)).
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protection, due process, and applicable state law doctrines such as man-
damus."l
Without completely preempting the authority of local governments
to make decisions regarding the placement of wireless communications
facilities, 2 the Act provides five separate and substantial protections for
the telecommunications facility applicant in the amended 47 U.S.C.
§ 332 (entitled National Wireless Telecommunications Siting Policy).
Section 332 provides that:
(A) the regulation of placement, construction, and modification
of personal wireless services facilities by any state or local gov-
ernment shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of
functionally equivalent services;
(B) the regulation of the placement, construction, and modifi-
cation of personal wireless service facilities by any state or local
government shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting
the provision of personal wireless services;
(C) once an applicant files a request for authorization to place,
construct, or modify a personal wireless service facility, the
governmental entity shall act on the application "within a rea-
sonable period of time after the request is duly filed";
(D) no state or local governmental entity may regulate the
placement, construction, or modification of personal wireless
service facilities on the basis of environmental effects of radio
frequency emissions to the extent that such emissions comply
with FCC regulations; and
(E) any decision by a state or local governmental entity to deny
an application to place, construct, or modify a personal wireless
service facility shall be in writing and supported by substantial
evidence contained in a written record.
4
The application of these protections is, of course, dependent upon
the context in which they are applied.
11. See BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 929 (granting relief under both the Act and
state mandamus law).
12. See id.
13. § 704(a)(7)(B), 110 Stat. 151-52 (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 332(a)(7)(B)).
14. Id.
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A. Governmental Action Shall Not Discriminate
The Act provides that the regulation of the placement, construction,
and modification of a telecommunications facility shall not unreasona-
bly discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services. 5
The term "functionally equivalent services" refers only to services that
directly compete against one another.16 A governmental authority is pro-
hibited from decisions that favor one telecommunications competitor
over another, while it is allowed some flexibility to treat differently fa-
cilities that create different visual, aesthetic, or safety effect, at least to
the extent permitted under generally applicable zoning requirements.
For example, the Act does not contemplate that if a cellular tower is
permitted in a commercial district, a tower of the same size and struc-
ture must also be allowed in a residential district.8 Accordingly, the
articulated intent of this specific protection is to prohibit a land use de-
cision or series of land use decisions that would decrease or deter
competition in the telecommunications industry and thereby frustrate
the purpose of the Act.
B. Governmental Action Shall Not Prohibit or Have the Effect of
Prohibiting the Provision of Personal Wireless Services
Under 47 U.S.C. § 332(7)(B)(i)0l), governmental policies that ex-
plicitly or effectively ban personal wireless services or facilities violate
of the Act, and governmental entities must treat each application to
place or construct a facility independently. 9 Although a state or local
government may deny an application based on stated objective criteria,
the criteria upon which the denial is based cannot have the effect of
banning telecommunications facilities, nor will a pattern of unsubstanti-
ated denials be tolerated under the Act.
Interestingly, in Spring Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, a plain-
tiff/appellant cellular provider filed suit under the Act claiming that a
six-month moratorium on the issuance of permits for wireless com-
munications facilities enacted by the defendant/appellee city violated
subsection (B)(i)(lI) of the Act because the ordinance's effect was
prohibitory.20 Because the moratorium was temporary in nature, how-
ever, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
15. Id. § 704(a)(7)(B)(i)(I) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(a)(7)(B)(i)(I)).





20. Spring Spectrum, 924 F. Supp. at 1039-1040.
1996-1997]
6 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 3:1
held that the moratorium was "not a prohibition on wireless facilities,
nor does it have a prohibitory effect. It is, rather, a short-term suspen-
sion of permit-issuing while the City gathers information and processes
applications. Nothing in the record suggests that this is other than a nec-
essary and bona fide effort to act carefully in a field with rapidly
evolving technology. Nothing in the moratorium would prevent Sprint's
application, or anyone else's, from being granted. '
Although the Medina Court made it clear that temporarily suspend-
ing the granting of permits for telecommunications facilities does not
violate the Act if it is of reasonable duration (six months), the Court
suggested that if all applications would have been denied during this
six-month period, the moratorium would have violated the Act.2 Of
course, any extension of the moratorium might also be violative of the
Act, constituting an unreasonable delay in processing the application
under subsection (B)(ii).
C. Upon Application for a Permit to Place, Construct, or Modify a
Wireless Facility, a Government Shall Act Upon the Application
Within a Reasonable Period of Time
Subsection (B)(ii) prevents a governmental unit from sitting on, or
refusing to rule on an application to place or construct wireless service
facilities.' Under this requirement, the governmental entity must re-
spond to the application within a reasonable time frame, "taking into
account the nature and scope of each request." If the application in-
volves a permitting procedure, a public hearing, or comment process,
the "reasonable period of time" requirement is satisfied if the period for
review of the application is the usual period under the applicable ordi-
nance or statutory scheme.2' It is not the intent of this provision to give
preferential treatment to the wireless communications industry in the
processing of requests, or to subject their requests to anything other than
the generally applicable time frame for ruling on applications.2' Thus, a
governmental entity need not rule more quickly than it would for an ap-
plicant in a non-telecommunications context.
In City of Medina, the plaintiff/appellant challenged the city's six-
month moratorium on the issuance of permits for wireless communica-
21. Id. at 1040.
22. Id.
23. § 704(a)(7)(B)(ii), 110 Stat. 151 (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)).
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tions facilities, alleging a violation of the "reasonable time" requirement.2
Because the city's moratorium did significantly prolong the approval
process for a special use permit, and because the moratorium applied
only to "wireless communications facilities"' , plaintiff/appellant
seemed to have a strong claim that a violation of subsection (B)(ii) had
occurred.29
The District Court for the Western District of Washington, however,
held to the contrary:
[t]here is nothing to suggest that Congress, by requiring action
"within a reasonable period of time," intended to force local
government procedures onto a rigid timetable where the cir-
cumstances call for study, deliberation and decision-making
among competing applicants. The City is seeking to determine,
among other things, whether tall antenna towers are still neces-
sary for the purpose at hand. It is entitled to find that out. The
"generally applicable time frames" for zoning decisions, in
Washington, may include reasonable moratoria adopted in
compliance with state law. To hold otherwise would afford tele-
communications applicants the "preferential treatment" that
Congress sought to avoid. Medina's moratorium, coupled with
its ongoing investigation and its processing of applications, is
consistent with this part of the [Act]."o
In so holding, the Medina court relied heavily on a statement within
the city's moratorium indicating that the purpose of the moratorium was
to study the Telecommunications Act, and the city's ability to regulate
wireless communications facilities in light of the Act." The court, there-
fore, left open the question as to what delays will be considered
unreasonable under the Act.
D. State or Local Governments May Not Regulate Wireless Facilities on
the Basis of Environmental Effects of Radio
Frequency Emissions if the Applicant
Demonstrates Compliance with FCC Regulations
From an applicant's perspective, the key to enforcing this require-
ment, codified in subsection (B)(iv), is to provide the governmental
decision-maker with evidence (field tests, engineering, specifications,
27. Spring Spectrum, 924 F. Supp. at 1040.
28. Id. at 1037.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1040.
31. Id. at 1038.
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etc.) demonstrating emissions from the protected facility are within
FCC limits. This evidence must be provided, of course, prior to any de-
cision on the application in question. The protection of subsection
(B)(iv) is applicable once these tasks have been accomplished by the
communication provider.
As written, the purpose of the requirement is to prevent telecommu-
nications siting decisions from being based upon unscientific or
irrational fears that emissions from telecommunications sites may cause
undesirable health effects. In a surprising number of public hearings on
the issue of cellular siting, individuals appear and complain of allegedly
harmful health effects, although the authors know of no studies sub-
stantiating such claims.'
E. Any Decision to Deny an Application to Place, Construct or Modify a
Wireless Facility Must be in Writing and Supported by Substantial
Evidence Contained in a Written Record
The protection that arguably has the most significant impact upon
the telecommunications industry is the "substantial evidence" standard,
which gives the telecommunications provider valuable protection in the
facilities siting context.3 The terms "in writing" and "contained in a
written record" are somewhat vague, but at the very least they require
some record upon which the decision to deny an application could be
based.TM As set forth in the legislative history of the Act, the "substantial
evidence" standard set forth in subsection(B)(iii) "is the traditional
standard used for judicial review of agency actions., 31 Substantial evi-
dence, as used in this context, means "more than a mere scintilla. It
32. See, e.g., BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 926 (describing comments made at
permit hearing by a homeowner, who spoke in opposition to the construction of the proposed
cellular monopole and claimed that its emissions might cause adverse health effects).
33. See BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 926 ("IT]he critical question before the
court is whether the board of commissioner's decision to deny plaintiffs' application is sup-
ported by 'substantial evidence contained in a written record.' "(Internal citations omitted.))
34. Given the intent of the Act to accelerate the development of telecommunications
technologies, the language "in writing" and "contained in a written record" appear to man-
date that a governmental entity, when denying an application to place wireless facilities,
must articulate the reasons for the denial and the evidence upon which said denial is based.
H.R. CoNF. REp. No. 104-458 at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124. Absent
this interpretation, the "written record" and "in writing" language appears to be superfluous.
A contrary interpretation would violate the maxim of statutory construction which presumes
that each word contained in a statute is to be given meaning and effect whenever possible.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Hinson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973); Jarecki v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303 (1961); D. Ginsberg and Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204
(1931).
35. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,223.
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means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."36
In applying the substantial evidence standard, a court should not a
merely rubber stamp a governmental entity's denial of an application. A
court is in fact obligated to ensure that the denial is supported by sub-
stantial evidence: "the [state or local government denying the
application] cannot rest its conclusions on a scintilla of evidence or even
on any amount of evidence that is less than substantial. Instead, the
[denial of an application] can be enforced only if [the court] find[s] in
the record 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support the conclusion."37 Although a reviewing court is not
free to substitute entirely its judgment for that of the governmental en-
tity, it must overturn the denial of an application "under the substantial
evidence test if it 'cannot conscientiously find that the evidence sup-
porting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the
record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed
to the denial."' 38
The stringent substantial evidence standard set forth in Section 704
of the Telecommunications Act must be distinguished from the much
more lenient "arbitrary and capricious" standard set forth in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act which also provides for judicial review of
agency action." The substantial evidence test requires the court to "take
a harder look at [agency] action than [it] would if [the court] were re-
viewing the action under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard applicable to agencies governed by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act."
Another factor which may affect the level of scrutiny that the re-
viewing court will apply to an application to place or construct a
wireless communications facility is the type of decision rendered by the
state or local government-i.e., whether the denial is legislative, or
whether it is administrative/quasi-judicial in nature. Determining
whether governmental action is legislative or administrative/quasi-
judicial turns on whether the governmental act involves policy-making
36. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,229 (1938)). See also America Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 522 (1981); Northport Health Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 1547,
1550 (lth Cir. 1992); Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 871 F.2d 980, 984 (11th Cir.
1989); BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 924.
37.. Northport Health Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992).
38. BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. 923 (N.D.Ga. 1996) (quoting Bickerstaff Clay
Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 871 F.2d 980, 984 (11th Cir. 1989).).
39. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A-E) (1988).
40. Color Pigments Mfrs. Ass'n v. OSHA, 16 F.3d 1157, 1160 (1 lth Cir. 1994) (quoting
Asbestos Info. Ass'n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1984)).
1996-1997]
10 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 3:1
or constitutes mere administrative application of existing policies.41 If
the governmental act involves policy-making, it is more likely legisla-
five; if the act involves administrative application of existing policies,
the decision is more likely quasi-judicial or administrative in nature.
Additionally, if the facts utilized by the government in making a deter-
muination are specific, rather than general, the decision is more likely
administrative or quasi-judicial. This is also true if the decision impacts
specific individuals rather than the general population.
If the court determines that the governmental action in question is
an administrative or quasi-judicial permitting decision, the court must
conduct a more stringent analysis of the governmental denial than it
would in the case of a decision involving legislative re-zoning. Courts
are more reluctant to overturn local land use decisions by governmental
entities when the decisions are legislative in nature. As stated by the
Supreme Court in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), "the ju-
diciary may not sit as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or
desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that nei-
ther affect governmental rights nor proceed along suspect lines."" It
41. Minton v. St. Bernard Parish School Bd., 803 F.2d 129, 135 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1964); Crymes v. DeKalb County, 923
F.2d 1482, 1485 (1lth Cir. 1991).
42. Id. See also Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front
Royal, Va., 865 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1989) (acts of zoning enforcement rather than rule-making
are not legislative); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995) (firing of clerk involved
the application of policy to a specific party and was not legislative in nature); Triomphe
Investors v. City of Northwood, 835 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Ohio 1993), affd, 49 F.3d 198 (6th
Cir.), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 70 (1995) (city council was acting in administrative or quasi-
judicial capacity in denying property owner's application for a land use permit). But see
Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (city council passed a new
ordinance blocking plaintiffs development, which was legislative in nature); City of New
Orleans v. Duke's, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (city council acted legislatively in amending ordi-
nance which prevented plaintiff from conducting her business); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City
of Medina, 924 F.Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (in enacting ordinance declaring six-month
moratorium on communications facilities, city acted in its legislative capacity); Nasser v.
City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432 (11th Cir. 1982) (rezoning of plaintiffs property was
legislative act); South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1974) (refusal to re-
zone property was legislative act).
43. See generally Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 Harv. L. Rev., 1427, 1510-11
(1978); Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1984); Crymes v. DeKalb County, Ga.,
923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991).
44. See also Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1389 (11th Cir. 1993)
("The district court appears to have put itself in the place of the city council and made a de
novo review of whether it would have taken the same action the city council did. Such scru-
tiny impinges upon the right and authority of municipalities to make land use decisions and
would alter the allocation of functions between municipal governments and federal courts.
This Court has admonished district courts not to usurp the role of city councils and zoning
boards."); Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that federal courts
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remains to be seen, however, what level of scrutiny will be applied to a
legislative zoning decision in the face of the stringent substantial evi-
dence standard prescribed by the Act.
IV. FILING SuIT: § 332(C)(7)(B)(v) OF THE ACT AUTHORIZES A
DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF A
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Subsection (B)(v) states, in pertinent part, as follows:
Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to
act by state or local government or any instrumentality thereof
that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within thirty
days after such action or failure to act, commence an action in
any court of competent jurisdiction. The court shall hear and
decide such action on an expedited basis.45
A. Type of Action and Evidentiary Questions
Although the Act describes the action to be filed by a jilted appli-
cant very generically, the legislative history of the Act makes clear that
the action should be couched in the terms of an appeal. 6 Given the fact
that the action is an appeal, the court, in reviewing the denial of the ap-
plication, is limited to the evidence and argument presented to the state
or local government below. Efforts to bolster the position of either the
communications provider or the government subsequent to the denial of
the application will be futile.47 It is therefore imperative that the com-
munications provider present the entirety of its evidence and argument
during the application process below. Like the appeal of a civil trial, an
do not sit as zoning boards of review and should be most circumspect in determining that
rights have been violated in quarrels over legislative zoning decisions).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
46. "The conferees intend that the court to which a party appeals a decision under
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v) may be the Federal district court in which the facilities are located or in a
State court of competent jurisdiction, at the option of the party making the appeal.. ." H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 209 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223 (emphasis
supplied).
47. In BellSouth Mobility, the county that had denied plaintiffs/appellants' application
for a permit to place a cellular tower attempted to file expert affidavits supporting its posi-
tion after rendering the denial, and during the pendency of the appeal under the Act. The
Court refused to consider the expert affidavits and based its decision only on the evidence
presented to the governmental decision-maker below.
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appeal under the Act will be decided solely on the basis of the record
below.48
B. Parties for Whom the Act Provides Protection
The specific language of the Act authorizes an appeal by numerous
potential claimants. The Act specifically provides that any person ad-
versely affected by a denial may file an appeal.49 The Act, therefore,
contemplates suits by appellants other than the individual/entity that
filed for governmental approval of the proposed facility. For instance, a
landowner's right to receive rentals for allowing a communication fa-
cility on his/her property may be foreclosed by a governmental denial.
Such an individual is protected by the Act." Although an interested
party does not necessarily have to file the application in question in or-
der to seek relief under the Act, if the party wants to ensure a successful
appeal, attention to the amount and type of evidence presented during
the application process is important.
C. Jurisdictional Issues
The Act authorizes appeal in "a court of competent jurisdiction." As
stated in the legislative history, a court of competent jurisdiction "may
be the Federal district court in which the facilities are located or a State
court of competent jurisdiction, at the option of the party making the
appeal .... 5' In determining which court is more advantageous to the
48. In BellSouth Mobility, a county ordinance authorized grant of a tall structure permit
if certain criteria were met by the applicant. The plaintiff/appellant cellular provider submit-
ted, with its application for a permit to construct a cellular monopole, overwhelming
evidence which satisfied the stated criteria including: evidence showing that the proposed
monopole posed no hazard to navigable airspace; evidence indicating that the monopole
would have no adverse effect upon residential property values; evidence demonstrating that
the cellular monopole's radio frequency emissions would be well within FCC limits; and that
the structure would be aesthetically compatible with the surrounding landscape. Because of
this overwhelming evidence submitted to the county, the court held that generalized con-
cerns stated in an argument against the monopole were not sufficient to authorize the
county's denial of the permit. Id.
49. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
50. In BellSouth Mobility, the applicant was a cellular communications company that
wished to construct a cellular monopole on a specific site in Gwinnett County, Georgia. The
applicant entered into a lease agreement with individuals that owned the proposed site. This
option and lease agreement authorized rental payments to the landowners should the mo-
nopole be constructed. Although the landowners never applied for any permit to construct
the facility, when the cellular provider was denied its permit, the landowners filed suit under
the Act along with the provider. The Court ruled in favor of both the provider and the land-
owners in ordering the county to grant them a permit to construct the monopole.
51. H.R. CoNr. REP. No. 104-458, at 209 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,
The Telecommunications Act of 1996
potential plaintiff/appellant, an analysis of the political climate sur-
rounding the governmental denial should be conducted.
Telecommunications facilities are often controversial and if local judges
are elected, the desires of local voters could play a major part in the ju-
dicial decision. Further, the potential claimant should consider whether
local courts will be deferential to the actions of local governments with
whom they may be, and often are, closely aligned. Finally, the potential
plaintiff/appellant should take into consideration the sophistication of
local judges and their ability to properly apply federal law.
D. Time for Judicial Review
The Act specifically requires that a court hearing an appeal under its
provisions "shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis. ' 2
No matter what forum is chosen, the plaintiff/appellant should attempt
to forego any discovery period and request an immediate hearing. This
request is not unreasonable because the appeal will be decided solely on
the basis of the evidence presented below, and no discovery is neces-
sary. Given the Congressional mandate of an expedited hearing and
decision,53 the plaintiff/appellant should be successful in getting a deci-
sion within a matter of months.M
E. Ripeness: Filing an Appeal Within the Required Time Period
Finally, and very importantly, the plaintiff/appellant must determine
when the appeal is ripe for consideration by the reviewing court. In or-
der to be appealable, the Act requires that the governmental denial be a
final action or failure to act55 and that the plaintiff/appellant must
commence the appeal within thirty days of such action or failure to act.56
As stated in the legislative history, the term "final action" means "final
administrative action at the State or local government level so that the
52. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
53. H.R. CoNF. REp. No. 104-458, at 209 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,
223 (emphasis supplied).
54. In BellSouth, the Appeal and Complaint was filed on May 21, 1996. A hearing on
the issues was scheduled on an emergency basis and took place on August 1, 1996, at time in
which almost all courts were closed during the Atlanta Olympic Games. Judge G. Ernest
Tidwell certified his decision on August 13, 1996. Thus, the District Court, acting in its ap-
pellate capacity under the Act, rendered a final decision less than three months from the date
the Appeal of Complaint was filed. See BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 944 F.
Supp. 923,925-926 (N.D.Ga. 1996).
55. § 704(a)(7)(B)(v), 110 Stat. 152.
56. Id.
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party can commence action under the [Act] rather than waiting for the
exhaustion of any independent State court remedy otherwise required."5 7
After the plaintiff/appellant receives notice that the application to
place the communications facility has been denied, the plain-
tiff/appellant must exhaust all available state and local administrative
remedies prior to filing an appeal under the Act. Once administrative
relief is exhausted, the appeal is ripe even if the plaintiff/appellant has
not utilized all available judicial remedies. 8 A plaintiff/appellant
should, therefore, analyze the applicable ordinance or local statute
governing the application to determine whether an administrative ap-
peal is provided. If so, the plaintiff/appellant must exhaust the
administrative remedies prior to filing suit under the Act. Once ad-
ministrative remedies have been exhausted, the plaintiff/appellant
must appeal within thirty days of a denial.
V. BELLSOUTH V. GWINNETT COUNTY: A CASE STUDY
BellSouth Mobility was the first case in which a claimant success-
fully obtained judicial relief under Section 704 of The
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Because this case of first impression
will have significant impact on future claims brought under the Act, a
brief analysis of the decision is important.
In BellSouth, plaintiff/appellant BellSouth Mobility Inc.
("BellSouth") sought to construct a cellular communications monopole
upon a designated site in Gwinnett County, Georgia. 9 The height of the
tower required that BellSouth obtain a tall structure permit prior to con-
structioni6 The county ordinance governing the issuance of tall structure
permits authorized the county to deny an application for a tall structure
57. H.R. Conf. ep. No. 104-458, at 9 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223.
58. Determining whether or not administrative remedies have been exhausted can be,
quite tricky. For instance, if a party is aggrieved by a decision of a local zoning board in
Alabama, Section 11-52-81 of the Alabama Code authorizes a direct appeal to a state circuit
court. Alabama decisional law interpreting this remedy holds that the appeal is purely ad-
ministrative in nature. See City of Gadsden v. Entrekin, 387 So.2d 829 (Ala. 1980) where
party was required to pursue and exhaust the administrative remedy contained in Section 11-
52-81, prior to seeking judicial relief. Arguably, then, this remedy must be exhausted prior to
filing suit under the Act. However, § 11-52-81 by requiring de novo review requires full-
blown discovery and authorizes a jury trial to review the decision of the local zoning board.
Given this fact, the Alabama scheme for reviewing a decision of a local zoning board in the
telecommunications context very well may violate the Supremacy Clause as it is directly in
conflict with the expedited treatment to be given applications for telecommunications facili-
ties articulated by the Act. See Ala. Code § 11-52-81; § 704(a)(7)(B)(v), 110 Stat. 152.
59. Bellsouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 923.
60. Id. at 924-925.
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permit when: (1) the proposed structure could interfere with air facili-
ties located within the county; (2) the structure could endanger person
or property within the county, or (3) the structure would not be com-
patible from an aesthetic viewpoint with surrounding area.61
In preparing to construct the monopole, BellSouth leased the sub-
ject property from the owners of the site and filed their application for
a tall structure permit with the county.62 The application was supported
by numerous evidentiary exhibits indicating that: (1) the monopole
would not interfere with navigable airspace in the area; (2) the mo-
nopole would not endanger persons or property nearby; and (3) the
structure would be compatible from an aesthetic viewpoint with the
existing facilities.63 No exhibit or documentary evidence was submit-
ted in opposition to the application.
A hearing was scheduled before the county's board of commis-
sioners and each side presented a five-minute argument. In opposition
to the application, a representative from a surrounding neighborhood
voiced concerns that the monopole would pose a safety threat to chil-
dren, that the monopole might cause damage during a storm, and that
the monopole would be aesthetically incompatible with existing
structures in the area. BellSouth also presented a five-minute argument
which was based primarily upon the documentary evidence previously
submitted in support of the application.6' At the conclusion of the argu-
ment, and without further discussion, the county board of
commissioners voted to deny the application.65 BellSouth subsequently
received a letter informing it of the permit denial, but the letter did not
give any reasons therefor, nor did it specify any evidence upon which
the denial had been based."
Because the ordinance in question did not authorize an adminis-
trative remedy if an application was denied, BellSouth, along with the
owners of the site upon which the monopole was to be constructed,
61. Id.
62. Id. at 925.
63. Id. at 924-926. The documentary evidence filed by BellSouth in support of its ap-
plication included line-of-sight photographs illustrating the view of the proposed monopole
from various surrounding locations; an appraisal report evidencing that the monopole would
have no adverse effect upon property values; a report indicating that the monopole would
present no hazard to navigable airspace in the area; and boundary survey and site plans
which demonstrated the nature of the proposed structure and which evidenced the distances
from the proposed site to adjacent parcels of land and residential dwellings.
64. Bellsouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 925-926.
65. Id. at 926.
66. Id. at 926 (quoting letter formally notifying plaintiffs that their "application for a
Tall Structure Permit was denied at the Board of Commissioners meeting on April 23,
1996").
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filed an appeal from the county's decision in the Federal District
Court in which the monopole was to be constructed.67 In bringing the
Telecommunications Act claim, plaintiffs/appellants relied exclu-
sively on the requirement of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)
[§ 704c(7)(B)(v), 110 Stat.], mandating that any denial "shall be in
writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written
record."' Along with the appeal under the Telecommunications Act,
plaintiffs/appellants prosecuted the action under a state-law manda-
mus theory, arguing that the county's board of commissioners abused
its discretion in denying the permit because the evidence clearly sup-
ported approval of the application. 69
In limiting its review to the evidence and argument presented to
the county below, the court ruled as follows on plaintiffs'/appellants'
"substantial evidence" claims under the Telecommunications Act:
[T]he court cannot conscientiously find that the evidence sup-
porting the board's decision to deny the plaintiffs a tall
structure permit is substantial. On the contrary, the court finds
that the record evidence supports plaintiffs' application."
The critical issue, however, was not whether the county had vio-
lated the Telecommunications Act, but the relief that would be granted
to plaintiffs/appellants. Fearing that remand of the application to the
county would result in an attempt by the county to bolster their decision
by hearing additional evidence from the opposition, plaintiffs/appellants
argued vehemently that the Act prohibited remand because it would
frustrate Congressional intent to provide an aggrieved party full relief
on an expedited basis.7' Additionally, plaintiffs/appellants argued that
remanding the case to the county would frustrate the purpose of the Act
because the board of commissioners would still be influenced by the
impermissible factors that caused them to deny the application in the
first instance-community opposition and political pressure.
The county contended that the Court should simply remand the
matter to the county and allow it to make a decision supported by sub-
stantial evidence.72 The county argued that it was improper for Federal
67. BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 926. See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at
209 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223 authorizing an appeal in the Federal
District where the facility is to be constructed.
68. BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 928. (internal citations omitted).
69. Id. at 929. See also O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 ("whenever, from any cause, a defect of le-
gal justice would ensue from a failure to perform or from improper performance, the writ of
mandamus may issue to compel a due performance..
70. Bellsouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 928.
71. Id. at 929.
72. Id.
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courts to usurp local government authority by directing issuance of a
permit, and that the Act did not authorize the Court to issue such an or-
der.
The Court held as follows:
Section 704(a) of the [Telecommunications Act] does not speak
to the issue of what relief a court may grant to remedy viola-
tions of the [Act]. Although it permits any person who has been
adversely affected by actions that are inconsistent with its pro-
visions to 'commence an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction,' it does not specify an appropriate remedy. The
[Telecommunications Act], however, does mandate that '[t]he
court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis.'
Indeed, the legislative history of the [Telecommunications Act]
makes it clear that its drafters intended that 'the court to which a
party appeals a decision under section 332(c)(7)(B)(v) may be
the Federal district court in which the facilities are located or a
State court of competent jurisdiction, at the option of the party
making the appeal, and that the courts act expeditiously in de-
ciding such cases.'
In the court's view, simply remanding the matter to the board of
commissioners for their determination would frustrate the
[Telecommunications Act's] intent to provide aggrieved parties
full relief on an expedited basis. Therefore, defendants' absten-
tion argument notwithstanding, the court finds that the
[Telecommunications Act] vests the court with sufficient
authority to grant plaintiffs' request for mandamus relief if such
relief would be warranted under the circumstances. '3
Accordingly, the BellSouth Court not only found that defen-
dants'/appellees' decision violated the Act because it was not based
upon substantial evidence, but also specifically ordered the county to
grant the application for the permit in question.
VI. CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that the Telecommunications Act of 1996
will have a significant impact upon facility siting decisions made by
local governments. The requirements set forth in the Act give a tele-
communications provider protection from the sometimes mercurial
73. Id. (internal citations omitted).
74. Id.
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temperaments of local governments as they relate to zoning and plan-
ning. The BellSouth decision provides additional protection because it
indicates that the judiciary should be aggressive in carrying out the ar-
ticulated Congressional desire to reduce barriers to entry and increase
competition in the telecommunications industry.
